2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
tillandClaude Opus 5	1d78535662	fix: findings from the code review of the mail and sharing work ... Two reviews, both dimensions. The serious ones, verified before fixing: Sessions never expired server-side and survived a password reset. `Max-Age` is a request to the browser, not a rule for the server, and `readSession` only checked the signature -- a leaked cookie stayed valid indefinitely, and the very reset meant to rescue a compromised account left the intruder logged in. A demoted admin also kept admin, because the role came from the cookie. Now the cookie carries a session epoch, `verifySession` checks the account against the database on every request and takes the role from there, and the epoch is bumped on password reset and on any role change. This was pre-existing, but the reset feature promised safety it did not deliver. "Allow download: off" did nothing for images with transparency -- exactly the cutouts and stickers this tool exists for. The view path skipped resizing when `has_alpha`, so the untouched original went out at full resolution, right-click saveable. Verified: now 1500x2000 instead of 2400x3200, and the download route returns 403. The share title went into outgoing mail HTML unescaped while the message was escaped -- a foreign link could be posted through the account's own SPF/DKIM-signed mailserver. Both escaped now, plus length limits. argon2 ran on every request for passphrase-protected links, including every image: 130 ms and 64 MiB each. A 40-image gallery would have walked into the memory limit, and a few dozen wrong guesses could have stalled the process. Checked once, then a short-lived signed cookie scoped to that one link. The passphrase moved from the query string to POST (it was landing in history and proxy logs) and wrong guesses are now rate limited. `days` accepted nonsense and quietly produced an unlimited link -- `Number('abc')` is NaN and `NaN > 0` is false. `[]` coerced to 0, same result. Now rejected outright, which matters when the pictures are of children. Rate limits keyed on `clientAddress`, which is the *first* X-Forwarded-For value -- set by the caller. Counting from the right instead, with the number of trusted proxies configurable (TRUSTED_PROXIES, default 1), plus per-username and per-recipient counters, a real limit on outgoing mail, and a limiter that expires entries individually instead of clearing everyone's counter. Also: expired links could still be mailed; missing PUBLIC_BASE_URL sent dead links while reporting success; the reset endpoint's response time revealed whether an account existed (send is no longer awaited); invalid UUIDs produced 500s; the email uniqueness race returned an HTML error page; share_views grew without bound and is now one row per visitor per hour, hashed per link, user agent reduced to browser and system, deleted after 90 days; double provenance marking appended a second XMP packet with the older model instead of replacing. 21 new tests (97 total) for shares, mail and provenance -- all three were completely untested, and that is where both reviews found the most. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BNhLunz586g6DeYMa7Qsd1	2026-09-01 03:25:02 +00:00
tillandClaude Opus 5	63d4b7d894	feat: e-mail, password reset and shareable links for images and collections ... Mail goes out through the account's own mailbox (SMTP) rather than a sending service: the domain lives there anyway, so SPF and DKIM line up by themselves and no third party gets to see the messages. Credentials are AES-256-GCM encrypted in settings like every other secret, never in the repo. nodemailer has zero dependencies and no native postinstall -- checked before adding it, given the history. Password reset: single-use token, only its hash is stored, one hour, and the request endpoint answers identically whether or not the address exists so it cannot be used to enumerate accounts. Rate limited per address. Share links (/s/<slug>) let someone without an account see the pictures and download them at full resolution. These are photos of children, so the defaults lean safe: every link expires by itself (30 days), can be revoked, optionally carries a passphrase, and the page and files are noindex. Access is bound to the link, not the image -- swapping in another item id on a valid link returns 404. Private-session results can never be shared at all. Tracking records when and with what, never who: IP addresses are only stored salted-and-hashed, so repeat visitors can be counted but nobody identified. Sharing goes out by mail (several recipients at once, no attachment -- a link can be withdrawn later, an attachment cannot) or via wa.me, which opens WhatsApp with the text prepared. The WhatsApp Business API would need a Meta account, approved templates and per-conversation fees; this works today for free and the API can slot in behind it later. Verified end to end against a local SMTP server: reset issues and consumes its token exactly once, the old password stops working, an unknown address gives the same answer, share mail reaches several recipients. Link behaviour checked for expiry (410), revocation (410), wrong passphrase (401) and download lock (403). Outbound SMTP is blocked in the sandbox, so the real mailbox still needs one test from the live server. Also fixes a regression this introduced: the seventh nav item pushed the logout button off screen at 820px. The bar now shrinks and scrolls, logout never does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BNhLunz586g6DeYMa7Qsd1	2026-09-01 03:02:33 +00:00